Implications of the New Rule Against Penalties by Palmer, Jessica
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3136890 
  305 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW RULE 
AGAINST PENALTIES 
Jessica Palmer* 
Whether a contractual term is penal and therefore unenforceable has usually been determined by 
distinguishing it from stipulations that are a reasonable contemplation of loss resulting from 
breach. This article considers recent decisions of the High Court of Australia and the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court that have made significant revisions of the rule. Both Courts have 
diverged from the traditional formulation and, to some extent, from each other. I argue that the 
traditional rule against penalties reflects foundational principles of contract law and not merely 
notions of fairness or justice in the round. The recent revisions to the rule have implications for the 
role and boundaries of contract law more generally and reflect increasing attention being paid to 
the "performance interest". 
I INTRODUCTION 
It has long been accepted that stipulated remedies within contracts will be unenforceable if 
penal. The rule against penalties has been the subject of much controversy. It is seen by many as an 
unjustifiable limit on the freedom of parties to contract on their own terms and judges have for a 
long time remarked on the difficulty of identifying an underlying principle.1 For almost a century, 
whether a clause is penal has been determined by distinguishing it from a liquidated damages 
clause, that is, a sum that amounts to a reasonable estimate at the time of contract formation of loss 
likely to result from breach.2 Three recent decisions, of the High Court of Australia3 and the United 
  
*  Associate Professor, University of Otago. I am grateful to Sam Cathro for his helpful research assistance 
and to participants of the Private Law Roundtable for debating some of the important points herein with me. 
All errors and heresies are of course my own. 
1  Astley v Weldon (1801) 2 Bos & Pul 346 at 350 at 350, 126 ER 1318 (Comm Pleas) at 1321 per Lord Eldon; 
Wallis v Smith (1882) 21 Ch D 243 at 256 per Sir George Jessell MR; and Robophone Facilities Ltd v Blank 
[1966] 1 WLR 1428 (CA) at 1446 per Diplock LJ as cited in Cavendish Square Holding BV v El Makdessi 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 (SC) at [3] per Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption. 
2  Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79 (HL). 
3  Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2012] HCA 30, (2012) 247 CLR 205; and 
Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28 [Paciocco (HCA)]. 
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Kingdom Supreme Court,4 have, however, made modifications to the rule that diverge both from the 
traditional formulation and from each other in significant respects.5  
This article considers these changes and the implications that they have for the penalty doctrine 
and, importantly, for the law of contract more generally. It begins by discussing the conventional 
understanding of the rule against penalties and the changes made to the rule by the recent cases. I 
will then suggest a justification for the rule against penalties in light of which the new modifications 
can be evaluated. In my opinion, the penalty doctrine has traditionally been tied to notions of loss 
and compensation because this reflects the fundamental means of enforcement used by the courts 
when a party breaches. I argue that the underlying concern of the rule against penalties is that 
parties' stipulated remedies cannot extend beyond the courts' own limits, otherwise the institution of 
contracting itself is threatened by the loss of the courts' ability to supervise and enforce the bargain. 
The move away from compensation to focus on the innocent party's legitimate interest in the 
performance of the contract represents a significant development in the penalty doctrine but one that 
is consistent with wider fundamental features of contract law.  If, however, the performance interest 
is to replace compensation as the relevant comparator, it must be understood to be qualified so that 
only interests which a court could normally condone and enforce can justify a stipulated remedy. 
II THE TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE RULE 
AGAINST PENALTIES 
The modern rule against penalties has usually consisted of a ritual incantation of Lord Dunedin's 
guidelines in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd (Dunlop).6 The case 
concerned a contract for the supply of tyres that required of the buyer that the tyres must not be on-
sold for less than the specified prices and that a sum of £5 per tyre was payable for every tyre sold 
in breach of the stipulation. The fine was held not to be a penalty because although it might have 
seemed at first sight to be an excessive amount, it was included in the contract in order to prevent "a 
system of injurious undercutting" likely to cause damage to the seller that would be impossible to 
estimate.7 The amount of the charge was not incommensurate with that objective.  
Lord Dunedin contrasted penalties with liquidated damages describing the latter as "a genuine 
covenanted pre-estimate of damage" and the former as "a payment of money stipulated as in 
terrorem of the offending party".8 Noting that the question was one of construction of the particular 
  
4  Cavendish, above n 1. 
5  Litigation that includes the question of penalties will be heard by the New Zealand Court of Appeal later 
this year, although it concerns the law of New South Wales rather than that of New Zealand: Torchlight 
Fund No 1 LP (in rec) v Johnstone [2015] NZHC 2559. 
6  Dunlop, above n 2. 
7  At 92 per Lord Atkinson. 
8  At 86. 
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contract, Lord Dunedin listed four tests that "may prove helpful, or even conclusive":9 first, a sum 
that is extravagant or unconscionable when compared to the greatest loss likely to be proved from 
breach is a penalty; secondly, where the breach is a failure to pay, a sum that is greater than the 
amount that was originally required to be paid will be a penalty; thirdly, a sum that is required to be 
paid in response to several different breaches that cause differing extents of damage is a penalty; 
and finally, a sum is not automatically a penalty simply because precise pre-estimation is not 
possible.  
Over time, the application of the penalty rule extended to other agreed remedies beyond 
stipulations to make payment, including withholding payment clauses and forced transfer clauses.10 
However, the Dunlop guidelines continued to be employed and the emphasis remained on 
contrasting the value and effect of the stipulated remedy with what would otherwise have been the 
remedy available to the aggrieved party.  
III RECENT MODIFICATIONS TO THE RULE 
A United Kingdom 
In 2015, the Supreme Court gave judgment on two appeals heard together concerning the 
penalty doctrine, Cavendish Square Holding BV v El Makdessi (Cavendish) and ParkingEye Ltd v 
Beavis (ParkingEye).11 The facts of each were very different. In Cavendish, a contract for the sale 
of a majority shareholding provided for the contract price to be paid by instalments and included a 
significant premium for goodwill of approximately USD 114,000,000. The goodwill was protected 
by means of restrictive trade covenants on the seller who had been instrumental in the company's 
success. In the event of breach, the purchaser could withhold payment of two of the instalments and 
exercise an option to buy the seller's remaining shareholding at net asset value excluding any 
goodwill component. The seller breached the covenants and sought to avoid enforcement of the 
terms on the basis that they were penalties. In ParkingEye, a user of a public carpark challenged the 
£85 fee for staying beyond the two-hour parking time limit as a penalty.12  
The important revision made by the Supreme Court to the rule against penalties related to the 
appropriate standard or test for identifying a penalty. The primacy of the compensation principle in 
Lord Dunedin's formulation has been criticised as too restrictive. It does not recognise instances 
  
9  At 87. 
10  Jobson v Johnson [1989] 1 WLR 1026 (CA); Amaltal Corp Ltd v Maruha (NZ) Corp Ltd [2004] 2 NZLR 
614 (CA); and Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 71, (2005) 224 CLR 656. 
11  Cavendish, above n 1. 
12  The case garnered significant public attention with the user of the carpark in ParkingEye having funded the 
litigation through the use of crowd funding. He had initially needed approximately £1,000 but attracted 
pledges amounting to £80,000. 
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where a remedial clause is employed for a legitimate commercial purpose other than simply to avoid 
financial loss, such as to protect a party's reputation. Dissatisfaction with both compensation and 
deterrence as the appropriate standards by which to identify penalties was clearly noted by Lord 
Neuberger and Lord Sumption:13 
The real question when a contractual provision is challenged as a penalty is whether it is penal, not 
whether it is a pre-estimate of loss. These are not natural opposites or mutually exclusive categories. A 
damages clause may be neither or both. The fact that the clause is not a pre-estimate of loss does not 
therefore, at any rate without more, mean that it is penal. To describe it as a deterrent (or, to use the 
Latin equivalent, in terrorem) does not add anything. A deterrent provision in a contract is simply one 
species of provision designed to influence the conduct of the party potentially affected. It is no different 
in this respect from a contractual inducement. Neither is it inherently penal or contrary to the policy of 
the law.  
The rule was said to be concerned with protecting parties from unconscionable or extravagant 
terms. But identifying unconscionability requires some standard or norm against which a term is to 
be judged. The Court replaced the yardstick of compensation with the notion of a legitimate interest 
in performance of the relevant primary obligation. The tests proposed in the multiple judgments are 
all consistent on this point, although worded slightly differently. 14  Lord Neuberger and Lord 
Sumption, with whom Lord Clarke and Lord Carnwarth concurred, described the test as:15 
… whether the impugned provision is a secondary obligation which imposes a detriment on the 
contract-breaker out of all proportion to any legitimate interest of the innocent party in the enforcement 
of the primary obligation. The innocent party can have no proper interest in simply punishing the 
defaulter. His interest is in performance or in some appropriate alternative to performance.  
The Dunlop test was not itself overturned but relegated to circumstances where the relevant 
agreed remedy is a stipulation to pay a sum of money.16 Indeed, the outcome in Dunlop is consistent 
with this approach. The interest being protected by the £5 charge per tyre was "the maintenance of a 
system of trade, which only functions if all trading partners adhere to it".17 The charge was not itself 
intended to be an accurate estimation of financial loss. 
Their Lordships' application of the law to the facts in Cavendish and ParkingEye highlighted 
some difficult issues. The Court was unanimous that the clauses in both cases were not penal, but 
  
13  At [31], Lord Clarke, Lord Carnwarth and Lord Hodge concurring. 
14  At [152] per Lord Mance, Lord Clarke and Lord Toulson concurring, and [255] per Lord Hodge, Lord 
Clarke and Lord Toulson concurring. 
15  At [32], Lord Clarke and Lord Carnwarth concurring. 
16  At [32] and [255]. 
17  At [152]. 
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the reasons given varied. There was disagreement on whether the particular clauses at issue were 
properly regarded as remedial or primary. 
In the Cavendish appeal, Lord Neuberger, Lord Sumption and Lord Carnwarth held that both the 
provision allowing the purchaser to withhold payment and the forced buyout were price adjustment 
clauses that were central to the contract. Where the seller failed to provide goodwill, by 
contravening the trade restraint, the contract provided that the buyer would pay less and the working 
relationship would be severed by virtue of the buy-out clause. Both clauses were not contractual 
alternatives to damages and did not prevent a claim for damages. Instead, they were part of the 
primary obligations of the parties and could not be subjected to the rule against penalties.18 The 
remaining Law Lords were ambivalent as to the classification of the withholding payment clause but 
ruled it was not a penalty given the buyer's legitimate interest in protecting the goodwill value.19 
Lord Hodge and Lord Clarke, however, viewed the buy-out clause as a secondary obligation but one 
that was not unconscionable in the context of the agreement as a whole. Ongoing cooperation and 
goodwill were both important components of the original price and it was conceivable that their 
demise would materially reduce the value of the business.20 
In the ParkingEye appeal, the Court emphasised the legitimate interest the carpark owner had in 
providing free parking to attract customers that required a regular turnover of carparks and an ability 
for the carpark operator to cover its costs of operating and monitoring the carpark.21 The charge for 
parking beyond the authorised time limit was not unconscionable or extravagant given the objective 
the carpark owner was trying to achieve and comparing the charge to that imposed by other carpark 
providers.22  
B Australia 
Class action over common bank fees have provided the context for the High Court of Australia 
to reconsider the penalty rule. Two decisions of the High Court of Australia have resulted. The first 
concerned the reach of the penalties doctrine; the second concerned the test for penalty. 
In Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (Andrews), decided three years 
before Cavendish, the Court was asked to determine whether bank fees applicable where a borrower 
exceeded approved limits were penal.23 The same question had been raised in an earlier decision of 
  
18  At [74], [80] and [81]. In any event, both clauses were justified by the purchaser's legitimate interest in 
measuring price by the value of the business being bought: at [75] and [82]. 
19  At [181] per Lord Mance and [278] per Lord Hodge. 
20  At [280]–[282] per Lord Hodge. 
21  At [98] per Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption. 
22  At [193]–[199] per Lord Mance and [284]–[288] per Lord Hodge. 
23  Andrews, above n 3. 
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the High Court of England and Wales, Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National Plc, where Andrew 
Smith J ruled that no breach was committed by a borrower who exceeded authorised limits.24 The 
relevant fees were not triggered by breach and therefore were not secondary remedial obligations 
capable of being subjected to the rule. 
The Court in Andrews emphasised the early equitable history of the rule in bonds cases to justify 
its position that there is an equitable form of the penalty doctrine which can apply to secondary 
obligations that arise as a result of failure, not just a breach, of a primary obligation.25 The penalty 
doctrine extends to "collateral" clauses that impose an additional detriment upon the "failure of the 
primary stipulation".26 In addition, the equitable jurisdiction enables remedial flexibility such that 
courts can award partial relief, unlike in the common law doctrine:27 
If compensation can be made to the second party for the prejudice suffered by failure of the primary 
stipulation, the collateral stipulation and the penalty are enforced only to the extent of that 
compensation. The first party is relieved to that degree from liability to satisfy the collateral stipulation. 
Evident in this remark is the clear contrast between compensation and penalty adopted by Lord 
Dunedin in Dunlop. An agreed remedy cannot give disproportionately more than compensation for 
the loss suffered and the striking down of an agreed remedy cannot deprive the innocent party of 
compensation altogether. Reference to the award as partial enforcement of the penalty clause is 
unhelpful. It is really the Court fulfilling its supervisory role by imposing its own secondary 
obligation on the defaulting party to pay compensation. Indeed, there is little difference in practical 
outcome between this equitable version of penalty and the common law rule given that, when a 
damages clause is struck down, the innocent party retains a right to seek damages for compensation 
at law.28 
In Cavendish, the United Kingdom Supreme Court rejected the Australian extension of the 
penalty rule to collateral obligations in Andrews.29 The High Court of Australia's historical analysis 
  
24  Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National plc [2008] EWHC 875, [2008] 2 All ER 625 (Comm). 
25  Andrews, above n 3, at [45]. 
26  At [10] per French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ, and at [45]. 
27  At [10]. 
28  United Dominions Trust (Commercial) Ltd v Ennis [1968] 1 QB 54, [1967] 2 All ER 345; Scandinavian 
Trading Tanker Co v Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana [1983] 2 AC 694 (HL); AMEV-UDC Finance Ltd v 
Austin (1986) 162 CLR 170 (HL); and Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] 
AC 573 (PC). 
29  Cavendish, above n 1, at [241] per Lord Hodge and [130] per Lord Mance. 
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was doubted and, more significantly, the approach was considered to be inconsistent with the court's 
limited jurisdiction to regulate only remedies for breach.30  
The second relevant decision of the High Court of Australia was handed down in July of this 
year. Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (Paciocco) concerned the 
enforceability of late payment fees on credit card accounts.31 The case did not specifically engage 
the first question of ambit. It was accepted by the bank that the relevant clause was triggered by 
breach. Nevertheless, the Court affirmed its earlier ruling in Andrews in the face of the Supreme 
Court's criticism of it in Cavendish. French CJ's short judgment emphasised that Australia had its 
own common law32 and Gageler J defended the historical analysis undertaken in Andrews.33   
However, as to the separate question of the test for penalty, the High Court of Australia adopted 
substantively the same approach as that of Cavendish. Emphasising that the rule against penalties 
should not unduly encroach upon freedom of contract,34 the majority held that a clause is not penal 
if it protects the legitimate interest of the party seeking to rely on the clause. Both Kiefel J, with 
whom French CJ concurred, and Keane J referred to a stipulated sum as being acceptable where it is 
commensurate with the relevant interests of the party in whose favour the stipulation was made.35  
In Nettle J's dissenting judgment, his Honour did not reject this approach altogether but rather held 
that it was only necessary to depart from the Dunlop test when the resulting damage is incapable of 
quantification such that a comparison with compensation is not possible.36   
On the facts, the bank admitted the late payment fee was not determined by any pre-estimate of 
ordinarily recoverable damages and sought to justify the fee on an ex post facto consideration of 
costs it had incurred. These costs, it said, extended beyond direct operational costs flowing from 
breach, to include loss provisioning37 and increases in regulatory costs. The majority accepted that 
late payment fees were included in the contract to protect the bank's legitimate interest in receiving 
timely repayments from its customers and that late payment adversely impacted upon the bank's 
  
30  At [42].  
31  Paciocco (HCA), above n 3. 
32  At [6]–[10]. 
33  At [118]–[127], 
34  At [156] per Gageler J and [220]–[221] per Keane J. See also [342] per Nettle J in dissent. 
35  At [52] per Kiefel J and  [269]–[270] per Keane J. See also [164]–[166] per Gageler J.  
36  At [317]–[321]. 
37  That is the diminution in value of debts held by the bank (as choses in action) attributable to the increased 
potential for non-recovery of the debt. 
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interest in the ways claimed.38 The late payment fee was not grossly disproportionate to these 
combined costs and thus not a penalty.39  
Despite the broad ambit of the penalty doctrine in Australia to clauses beyond remedies for 
breach, the legitimate interest comparator approach sets a high threshold for establishing a penalty 
given that most stipulated remedies can be justified in some way or other by the interests of the 
enforcing party. For that reason, it is suggested that clauses declared to be penal will be rather few 
and far between in both Australia and the United Kingdom.40  
C Two Different Rules? 
In summary, the High Court of Australia and the United Kingdom Supreme Court have adopted 
two different approaches to the ambit of the rule against penalties. In the United Kingdom, only 
obligations that take effect on breach engage the rule against penalties. In Australia, a secondary or 
collateral obligation may be the subject of attention if it is triggered either by breach or failure of a 
primary condition. The Australian approach widens the reach of the penalty doctrine and grants 
remedial discretion to the court, neither of which is attractive to those who regularly draft 
contracts.41 On the question of the standard by which a clause is to be adjudged penal, however, 
there appears to be little divergence.  
Both Courts judge the clause against the interest of the party seeking to enforce the clause. 
Parties are allowed to stipulate remedies for reasons other than the provision of a pre-estimated loss. 
This approach enables greater freedom42 and probably increased confidence for contracting parties 
given that clauses that may once have fallen foul of the penalties doctrine will survive, it appears, so 
  
38  At [58]–[68] per Kiefel J and [171]–[176] per Gageler J. 
39  Keane J also reasoned that the bank's interest in lending profitably necessitated a fee for late payment 
because late payment increases a bank's risk and therefore inhibits its ability to maximize its revenues by 
reducing costs and attracting more customers: at [277]–[278]. This overtly economic analysis should be 
treated cautiously. Its effect would seem to be that any stipulated payment for breach could never be a 
penalty because breach will usually always be an economically inefficient outcome for the innocent party, 
thus justifying that party's use of a stipulated sum to discourage or remedy the inefficiency. If that is the 
case, there is no rule against penalties. 
40  Katy Barnett "Coralling the penalties horse: Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd" (8 
August 2016) Melbourne Law School: Opinions on High, High Court Blog <www.blogs.unimelb.edu.au>. 
41  See for example practitioner commentaries: Tracey Petter "Supreme Court unshackles the rule on penalties" 
(16 November 2015) Dentons <www.dentons.com>; Julian Acratopulo "Landmark Supreme Court Decision 
– The Penalties Doctrine Lives On (In a New Guise)" (4 November 2015) Clifford Chance 
<www.cliffordchance.com>; Rachel Chaplin "Liquidated damages and the law on penalties" (11 November 
2015) Clyde&Co <www.clydeco.com>; and Elizabeth Macknay, Matthew Keogh and Tim Goyder 
"Penalties and protecting legitimate interests: differences between the United Kingdom and Australia" (23 
November 2015) Herbert Smith Freehills <www.herbertsmithfrehills.com>. 
42  Lord David Hope "The Law on Penalties – A Wasted Opportunity?" (2016) 33 JCL 93. 
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long as there is a reasonable explanation for their presence. Certainly, the application of the revised 
approach by both Courts to the particular clauses before them suggests as much. In order to evaluate 
these revisions made to the penalty rule, it is necessary to provide some explanation of the 
underlying concern that the law is seeking either to correct or to protect by the rule.  
IV A JUSTIFICATION FOR THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH: 
UPHOLDING THE COURT'S REMEDIAL JURISDICTION 
In my opinion, the penalty doctrine is best understood as a necessary protection of the court's 
remedial jurisdiction in order that contracts remain legally enforceable. The focus on a comparison 
between the stipulated clause and the compensation that would otherwise be available was justified 
because it preserved the court's absolute jurisdiction to enforce contracts by providing that breaches 
be compensated.43  
This justification can be explained in the following way. In the absence of any established 
ground for setting aside contracts,44 parties are assumed to have freely entered into and freely given 
undertakings to each other. It is the law of contract that renders those obligations legally enforceable 
and it is the role of the court to effect enforcement. Enforceability is a key attribute of a contract; it 
distinguishes contracts from mere social agreements. However, the means of enforcement that the 
common law uses are indirect. It does not enforce performance of the parties' agreed undertakings 
themselves, known as primary obligations. Instead, it recognises or imposes secondary obligations 
that require the defendant to remedy breach of his or her primary obligations by compensating for 
any harm suffered from failure to perform the primary obligations.45 Thus, a basic principle of 
contract law is that where a party breaches, he or she will not usually be ordered to perform but to 
compensate the other party for any loss suffered. 46  At common law, the default rule is 
compensation.47 We say that he or she is under a secondary obligation to make good any loss 
arising from breach of the primary obligation. These secondary obligations are the domain of the 
court. Were one party permitted to stipulate that the other is obliged to pay damages which are 
  
43  Cavendish, above n 1, at [42]; Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2014] FCA 35, 
[2015] FCAFC 50 [Paciocco (FCFCA)] at [25] per Allsop CJ; and Torchlight Fund, above n 5, at [83]. 
44  Such doctrines include undue influence, duress, unconscionable bargains, and mistake. 
45  Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827 (HL) at 848–849 per Lord Diplock. This is 
in contrast to equity where enforcement of the primary obligation is readily available: see P&O Nedlloyd 
BV v Arab Metals Co [2007] 2 Lloyd's Rep 231 (CA) at [47] per Moore-Bick LJ. Equity follows the 
common law and so will not respond to a breach of contract with a performance remedy unless there is an 
additional factor that would demand a remedy beyond that available at common law, such as where 
damages are inadequate. 
46  Trey Qualls "Take a Second-Look at Liquidated Damages in Texas" (2015) 67 Baylor L Rev 666 at 674. 
47  Exports Credits Guarantee Dept v Universal Oil Products Co [1983] 1 WLR 399 (HL) at 403 per Lord 
Roskill. 
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excessive in comparison with what a court would or could award, the term would place a court 
called upon to enforce it in a position of inherent contradiction.  
The rule against penalties is thus consistent with two key values of the common law of contract: 
first, parties to a contract are generally free to determine for themselves the content of the primary 
obligations they will accept; 48  and, secondly, courts will usually enforce primary contractual 
obligations only indirectly by imposing secondary remedial obligations. The presumptive remedy 
(or secondary obligation) for breach of contract is compensation for loss arising.   
As to the first value, there are, of course, examples within the law where parties' freedom to 
determine their own primary obligations is limited. Terms may be implied contrary to the parties ' 
own intention, such as terms implied into contracts for the sale of goods.49 Likewise, terms may be 
excluded by statute despite the parties' apparent agreement. The recent enactment of an unfair 
contract terms regime in New Zealand is an example of this.50 For the most part, these restrictions 
belong in the legislative domain where they are deemed necessary by Parliament in order to give 
effect to a competing public policy or value and can be carefully prescribed. Contract law does 
recognise the ability of courts to imply terms in fact but there has been much controversy in recent 
years regarding the precise approach to be taken to implication.51 There is a general acceptance that 
terms are not to be too easily implied and the New Zealand courts have shown recently a hesitancy 
to depart from the parties' existing terms and the ordinary meaning thereof unless there is a clear gap 
in the written terms that must be filled.52 Likewise, there is no general liberty on the part of the 
courts to ignore parties' express terms.  
The second value mentioned above, that courts enforce contracts indirectly by the secondary 
obligation of compensation for loss resulting from breach, explains why despite a reticence to 
disturb parties' primary obligations, courts will entertain challenges to secondary or remedial 
obligations stipulated in the contract. Secondary obligations are the means used by the law of 
contract to enforce contractual obligations. Without this means of enforcement, contract law would 
be rendered impotent. The relevance of the court's supervisory role to the penalty doctrine was 
  
48  Cavendish, above n 1, at [73]. 
49  Sale of Goods Act 1908; and Consumer Guarantees Act 1993. 
50  Fair Trading Act 1986, s 26A. 
51  Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd  [2009] 1 WLR 1988 (PC); Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL 
Holdings Pte Ltd [2013] SGCA 43, [2013] 4 SLR 193; Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36; and Marks and 
Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd  [2015] 3 WLR 1843 (SC). 
52  Satterthwaite v Gough Holdings Ltd [2015] NZCA 130 at [67] (leave to appeal refused by the Supreme 
Court in Gough v Gough Holdings Ltd [2015] NZSC 115); and Firm PI 1 Ltd v Zurich Australian Insurance 
Ltd & Body Corp 398983 [2014] NZSC 147, [2015] 1 NZLR 432. 
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recognised by the Supreme Court in Cavendish in its refusal to extend the doctrine beyond remedial 
terms. As Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption said:53 
Modern contracts contain a very great variety of contingent obligations. Many of them are contingent on 
the way the parties choose to perform the contract … The potential assimilation of all of these to clauses 
imposing penal remedies for breach of contract would represent the expansion of the courts' supervisory 
jurisdiction into a new territory of uncertain boundaries, which has hitherto been treated as wholly 
governed by mutual agreement. 
An objection can be raised at this point that because the law of contract allows parties to agree 
to their own remedies and, indeed, such clauses are common practice it cannot be solely the court's 
remit to determine the parties' secondary obligations to compensate. Indeed, some argue that the 
principle of freedom of contract demands otherwise.54 However, the presence of such clauses does 
not mean that the law is allowing the parties to usurp the court's enforcement role. Rather, agreed 
remedies are permitted because they are (and only so long as they are) a helpful proxy for the court 's 
determination of the compensation payable. This is really just a concession to efficiency. Agreed 
remedies save significant time and cost for both the court and the parties at the point of breach and 
promote certainty, so long as they are consistent with (and do not usurp) the court's remedial 
jurisdiction.55 It is thus clear that agreed remedies must be limited by the compensation principle 
otherwise the court's enforcement role is jeopardised and the institution of contracting is 
consequently placed in doubt. The rule against penalties is the means by which the court can enforce 
the compensation principle in the face of parties' attempts to determine their secondary obligations 
for themselves.56  
The law's tolerance of limitation and exclusion clauses does not undermine this reasoning. 
Penalty clauses threaten the courts' ability to enforce contracts because they overcompensate the 
innocent party, something that the law of contract does not allow a court to do.57 The court cannot 
impose a secondary obligation to overcompensate and thus it cannot logically enforce the term. 
Limitation and exclusion clauses, on the other hand, are usually employed by contracting parties in 
  
53  Cavendish, above n 1, at [42]. 
54  Lord Hope, above n 42.  
55  Francis Dawson "Determining Penalties as a Matter of Construction" [2016] LMCLQ 207 at 218; and 
Qualls, above n 46, at 672. 
56  Indeed, that the plaintiff can claim damages for breach where an agreed remedies clause is unenforceable as 
a penalty is further support for the argument presented here that the underlying concern is to give effect to 
the compensation principle: see the cases cited above n 28.  
57  Bloxham v Robinson (1996) 7 TCLR 122 (CA); C&P Haulage v Middleton [1983] 3 All ER 94 (CA); and 
Omak Maritime Ltd v Mamola Challenger Shipping Co [2010] EWHC 2026, [2011] 1 Lloyd's Rep 47 (QB). 
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order to undercompensate for loss. The assumption by a party of a lesser secondary obligation does 
not present the same threat to the court's enforcement role.   
The compensation principle has been a key feature of contract law that limits freedom of 
contract to the extent that parties cannot attempt to require greater secondary obligations than the 
court will impose.  
Thus, the link between compensation and penalty is essential to the supervisory role of the 
court. Lord Dunedin's identification of penalties by a comparative exercise with compensation was 
therefore justified. Yet, the compensation comparator is only relevant so long as the relief available 
at law for breach of contract is limited to compensation. Were punitive damages to become 
available for breach of contract, for example, a penalty clause may no longer be inconsistent with 
the courts' jurisdiction.58 Contract law in New Zealand does not punish parties in breach of their 
primary obligations.59 Hence, where parties stipulate a remedy that does in fact punish, it cannot be 
enforceable by the court and so it must be rejected as an inappropriate proxy for the court 's 
determination of remedy. However, as will be discussed further herein, it may be that the scope of 
the compensation principle within contract law is expanding as the courts show a greater willingness 
to consider the particular interests bargained for by the relevant parties themselves, often referred to 
as their performance interest or legitimate interest. Some clauses that once would have been 
considered penal may no longer be so because a broader view is taken of the parties' interests and 
therefore of loss. This does not necessarily mean that the Dunlop test is wrong, but rather that the 
likely damage for which compensation would be available and to which the stipulated remedy must 
be compared has changed.  
It is then necessary to consider whether the modifications made to the Dunlop test in Andrews 
and Cavendish are coherent within the remedial jurisdiction justification proffered here or whether 
they suggest that a different justification and a significantly different rule should be adopted in New 
Zealand. I turn now to offer some critical reflections on the Australian and English modifications to 
the penalty doctrine from a New Zealand perspective. 
  
58  The requirement that the stipulated term must not be extravagant or disproportionate would remain but the 
relevant comparator would not be the loss likely to be recoverable, but the exemplary damages likely to be 
recoverable. This, again, emphasises that the court's enforcement role cannot be ousted by the parties 
whatever the remedies available to the court. 
59  Paper Reclaim Ltd v Aotearoa International Ltd [2006] 3 NZLR 188 (CA). 
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IV IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW RULES 
A The Ambit of the Rule  
1 Secondary obligations and the breach limitation 
The High Court of Australia's rejection of the breach limitation on the penalty doctrine has come 
under significant criticism from both academics 60  and judges. 61  Whether or not the Court's 
historical analysis was correct, equity's aversion to penalty clauses has long since been absorbed 
into the common law. Equity follows the law and does not usurp the common law's jurisdiction 
unless there can be demonstrated some lacuna or inequity in the operation of the common law. Yet, 
it is not difficult to justify the different treatment that remedial clauses responding to breach receive 
in the common law penalty rule such that there is no inequity arising. 
As explained above, the distinction between primary obligations and secondary obligations 
arising upon breach is critical. Contract law maintains a healthy respect for the parties' autonomy to 
make bargains, both good and bad. For this reason, the power afforded to the court by the penalty 
doctrine to ignore particular terms of the contract should not extend to rewriting parties' primary 
obligations. However, a viable contract law requires that courts must be able to enforce contracts. 
Enforcement is achieved indirectly by the recognition of a secondary obligation to require a remedy 
(compensation) in the event of breach. Parties can attempt to incorporate a secondary obligation into 
the contract at the time of entering into their primary obligations for the sake of efficiency and 
certainty, but courts must retain the ability to review and set aside secondary obligations that 
overreach the compensation principle and thus usurp the courts' authority. Breach of a primary 
obligation is a necessary prerequisite of a secondary obligation and therefore a necessary 
requirement before the rule against penalties can apply. The rule against penalties must be limited to 
secondary obligations arising in the event of breach because, by definition, this is the only way that 
a secondary obligation comes into existence. 
Removing the breach limitation as the High Court of Australia has done extends the court's 
jurisdiction to interfere with not only secondary obligations, properly so called, but with a range of 
other clauses seen to be collateral to the main agreement. Apart from the practical difficulty of 
deciphering which clauses are collateral, the approach is a significant intrusion into party autonomy 
without an accompanying clarity as to the justification of the intrusion. If the reasons are to do with 
some broader notion of correcting unconscionability or oppression, as will be discussed further 
  
60  JW Carter and others "Contractual Penalties: Resurrecting the Equitable Jurisdiction" (2013) 30 JCL 99; 
Edwin Peel "The Rule Against Penalties" (2013) 129 LQR 152; and Sirko Harder "The Scope of the Rule 
Against Contractual Penalties: A New Divergence" in Andrew Robertson and Michael Tilbury (eds) 
Divergences in Private Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2016) 135. 
61  Cavendish, above n 1, per Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption. 
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below, it is difficult to see why the rule stops at collateral obligations. The current Australian 
approach is, with respect, an odd sort of halfway house that cannot be explained coherently. 
2 Classifying primary and secondary obligations 
The tension that exists between primary and secondary obligations can be explained as the result 
of balancing freedom of contract with the compensation principle. The parties are at liberty to 
determine their primary obligations but the court will interfere to prohibit one party from punishing 
the other when breach occurs. Yet while as a matter of principle, the distinction so important to the 
penalty rule between primary and secondary obligations may be clear, the classification of a term as 
a matter of fact as either primary or secondary can seem arbitrary at times. With skilful drafting, 
remedial clauses can be converted into primary obligations or conditional collateral obligations that 
are out of reach of the rule against penalties.62 For example, fees for late completion can be 
rewritten as discounts for early completion and withholding payment clauses can be drafted as price 
adjustment clauses.  
The problem of evasion of the rule by clever drafting is probably not resolvable and it would 
create huge uncertainty and transactional expense if all contractual clauses could be subjected to the 
scrutiny of the court.63 Some commentators have suggested that the distinction between primary and 
secondary obligations is so arbitrary that the alternative approach of abandoning the rule against 
penalties altogether is to be preferred.64  It has also been noted that the increasing legislative 
protection from unfair terms and the other established protective doctrines in the common law of 
contract (such as lack of notice, duress and undue influence) mean that there is no need for the 
continued application of a rule against penalties. However, arguments in Cavendish that the rule 
should be abolished or restricted were not met with enthusiasm by the Supreme Court and are 
unlikely to be successful in New Zealand either.65 If, as has been argued here, the concern of the 
rule against penalties is to ensure the court retains an ability to enforce contracts, it is different from, 
rather than made redundant by, other doctrines and rules that apply to protect weaker parties from 
unfair terms. 
  
62  Sarah Worthington "Common Law Values: The Role of Party Autonomy in Private Law" in Andrew 
Robertson and Michael Tilbury (eds) The Common Law of Obligations: Divergence and Unity (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2016) 301 at 316. 
63  Bobby Lindsay "Penalty Clauses in the Supreme Court: A Legitimately Interesting Decision?" (2016) 20 
Edin LR 204 at 207; and Martin Hogg "Some further thoughts on the penalty clause rule in the Supreme 
Court" (16 March 2016) Obligations Law Blog <www.obligations.law.ed.ac.uk>. 
64  Peel, above n 60, at 156; Edwin Peel "Unjustified Penalties or an Unjustified Rule Against Penalties? 
(2014) 130 LQR 365; Worthington, above n 62 at 322; and James C Fisher "Rearticulating the Rules 
Against Penalty Clauses" [2016] LMCLQ 169 at 171. 
65  See for example Cavendish, above n 1, at [162]–[270] per Lord Mance, and [256] and [261] per Lord 
Hodge. 
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Indeed, the distinction between primary and secondary obligations may not be too difficult to 
draw. As Lord Mance suggested in Cavendish:66 
… in most cases parties know and reflect in their contracts a real distinction, legal and psychological, 
between what, on the one hand, a party can permissibly do and what, on the other hand, constitutes a 
breach and may attract a liability to damages for – or even to an injunction to restrain – the breach. 
The parties' drafting will not necessarily be determinative. The judgments in Cavendish on this 
point show that classifying the clause is a question of construction over which judges may 
reasonably disagree.67 It may also be that the two enquiries contained in the penalties rule are not 
exclusive of each other: asking whether the clause meets the substantive test for a penalty may 
reveal whether the clause is a primary or secondary obligation. This is particularly so if the Dunlop 
test is used.  
B The Test for Penalties 
1 The role of unconscionability and good faith 
In contrast to the remedial jurisdiction justification advocated in this article, some commentators 
consider that the penalty doctrine is concerned with requiring good faith and fairness in contractual 
relations.68 In the same vein, some courts have emphasised that the penalties doctrine is only 
engaged where the clause can be said to be oppressive or unconscionable.69 In Elsley v JG Collins 
Insurance Agencies Ltd Dickson J in the Supreme Court of Canada said: 70 
It is now evident that the power to strike down a penalty clause is a blatant interference with freedom of 
contract and is designed for the sole purpose of providing relief against oppression for the party having 
to pay the stipulated sum. It has no place where there is no oppression. 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal relied on this passage in Amaltal Corporation Ltd v Maruha 
(NZ) Corporation Ltd71 when it rejected an argument that a forced transfer clause in a joint venture 
  
66  At [130]. 
67  See above n 18. 
68  JW Carter and Elisabeth Peden "A Good Faith Perspective on Liquidated Damages" (2007) 23 JCL 157; 
and William Day "Penalty Clauses Revisited" [2014] JBL 512. 
69  AMEV-UDC Finance Ltd, above n 28, at 193–194 per Mason and Wilson JJ; and Yarra Capital Group Pty 
Ltd v Sklash Pty Ltd [2006] VSCA 109. 
70  Elsley v JG Collins Insurance Agencies Ltd [1978] 2 SCR 916 (SCC) at [47] cited with approval in Philips 
Hong Kong Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong (1993) 612 BLR 49 (PC) at 57–58. 
71  Amaltal Corporation Ltd v Maruha (NZ) Corporation Ltd [2004] 2 NZLR 614 (CA). 
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agreement was a penalty.72 In a judgment delivered by Blanchard J, the Court noted as relevant that 
there was no appearance of actual or potential oppression in the agreement.73 
Caution must be exercised when referring to notions of oppression, unconscionability, 
unfairness and lack of good faith as if they are absolute tests. These are abstract notions with no 
substantive objectively determined criteria of their own. If the doctrine were to be decided on the 
basis of these values alone, it would create significant uncertainty.74 
It is a mistake to assume that unconscionability or any similar notion can serve adequately as the 
content of the rule. Some norm or standard is required by which the stipulated term can be evaluated 
to determine whether it is in fact oppressive or unconscionable and hence unenforceable. In most 
cases, proving oppression or inequality of bargaining power per se has not been a necessary or 
sufficient element of establishing a penalty.75 Instead, the focus has been on the comparison of the 
agreed remedy and likely loss to assess whether the agreed remedy is oppressive or unconscionable. 
Indeed, that is how Lord Dunedin referenced unconscionability in his formulation of the rule in 
Dunlop Tyres:76  
… it will be held to be a penalty if the sum stipulated for is extravagant and unconscionable in amount 
in comparison with the greatest loss that could conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach.  
In this article I have suggested an explanation of the rule against penalties that operates to 
prevent parties from using agreed remedies to achieve overcompensation. Such provisions have the 
effect of punishing the breaching party. Because punishment is not a function of the law of contract, 
it would be unconscionable for the innocent party to rely on, and for the court to condone, a clause 
that extends disproportionately beyond compensating for harm suffered. Unconscionability in this 
context is judged by the standard of compensation. Of course, the court's conception of what is 
unconscionable may change over time. For example, it is conceivable (although in my opinion 
regrettable77) that punitive damages may one day be a permitted remedy for breach of contract. If 
that point is reached, it would be inappropriate to use compensation as the sole norm against which 
to evaluate parties' agreed remedies. But in any event, what will be unconscionable must be assessed 
  
72  The case primarily concerned whether the rule against penalties was a matter of "public policy" as provided 
for in Art 34 of the First Schedule to the Arbitration Act 1996 for the purpose of allowing an appeal against 
an arbitral award. The Court held it was not and, even if an appeal had been permitted, the clause was not a 
penalty.  
73  Amaltal Corporation Ltd, above n 71, at [58]–[61]. 
74  Cavendish, above n 1, at [259] per Lord Hodge. 
75  Torchlight Fund, above n 5, at [102]–[105]. 
76  Dunlop, above n 2, at 87 (emphasis added). 
77  Ernest Weinrib "Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies" (2003) 78 Chic-Kent LR 55; and 
Allan Beever "The Structure of Aggravated and Exemplary Damages" (2003) 23 OJLS 87. 
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by reference to the remedies ordinarily available to the court given that remedies are the means used 
by courts to enforce contracts. The significance of the Supreme Court's decision in Cavendish is the 
shift away from compensation as the criterion or norm against which unconscionability is assessed 
towards a performance-based interest. 
My argument in this section has been simply to warn against any formulations of the rule 
against penalties that seek to invoke broad notions of oppression, extravagance, unconscionability 
and the like without application of some detailed criterion or more concrete norm.  
2 The increasing importance of the performance interest 
The clear view of both the United Kingdom Supreme Court and the High Court of Australia is 
that a clause should not be said to be penal merely because it amounts to more than the likely 
compensatory response to breach. Both Courts have held that the genuine pre-estimate of loss test is 
not fundamental to the penalty inquiry because it does not conclusively prove that the clause is or is 
not penal in the sense that one party is punishing the other. Instead, the appropriate norm is the 
legitimate interest of the innocent party in the enforcement78 or performance79 of the [primary] 
obligation.80 While compensation remains relevant, it "is not necessarily the only legitimate interest 
that the innocent party may have in the performance of the defaulter's primary obligations".81 
In Cavendish, their Lordships opined that the Dunlop comparison with pre-estimated loss is 
normally appropriate for specified sum clauses because the parties' interest in such a clause will 
usually be to provide compensation for breach.82 But the loss comparator was not considered 
appropriate where parties are seeking to protect interests other than compensation. Lord Mance gave 
the following examples:83 
The maintenance of a system of trade, which only functions if all trading partners adhere to it ( the 
Dunlop case), … terms of settlement which provide on default for payment of costs which a party was 
prepared to forego if the settlement was honoured (the Cine Bes case); likewise, also the revision of 
financial terms to match circumstances disclosed or brought about by a breach: Lordsvale and other 
cases. 
The notion that the performance interest is relevant to the penalty inquiry is not entirely new. In 
deciding the £5 charge was not a penalty in Dunlop, Lord Atkinson referred to the seller's object in 
  
78  Cavendish, above n 1, at [31]–[32] per Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption. 
79  At [255] per Lord Hodge. 
80  At [31]–[32] per Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption. 
81  At [32] per Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption, and [247] per Lord Hodge. 
82  At [32] per Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption, and [152] per Lord Mance. 
83  At [152] per Lord Mance. 
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making the agreement, finding that the charge was necessary to "to prevent the disorganisation of 
their trading system and the consequent injury to their trade".84 In Nettle J's dissenting judgment in 
Paciocco, his Honour also referred to the importance of the parties' underlying interest for which 
protection is being sought. However, rather than seeing this as something different from the 
compensation interest, his Honour viewed Lord Dunedin's compensation comparison as giving 
effect to the performance interest:85 
… ordinarily the only legitimate interest of an innocent party in the performance of a primary obligation 
is in its performance or in some appropriate alternative to performance. Hence, in the case of a 
"straightforward damages clause" the innocent party's interest will rarely extend beyond compensation 
for the breach and, therefore, in such a case, it is to be expected that the Dunlop tests will usually be 
"perfectly adequate" to determine whether a provision is a penalty.  
The weakness of an exclusively compensatory comparison to determine penalties could be said 
to be illustrated by the facts of the ParkingEye case. The carpark operator was not liable to suffer 
any direct loss as a result of overstaying motorists given that there was no charge to use the carpark. 
Nevertheless, several factors pointed to the carpark operator having a legitimate interest in charging 
overstaying motorists and the charge was not excessive given that interest. Both the carpark 
operator and the carpark owner had a legitimate interest in controlling access to the carpark to 
ensure customers could access the retail outlets which the carpark serviced, to encourage prompt 
turnover of car parking spaces, and to fund the cost of operating the carpark. All of these were 
achieved effectively by the overstay charge.86 The amount of the charge was not substantially 
higher than that charged by local authorities for car parks on public land and thus was not excessive 
or extravagant.87 Accordingly, the Court ruled unanimously that the charge was not a penalty.  
In New Zealand, the performance interest has been explicitly recognised and incorporated into 
the law on contractual damages.88 This is, on the whole, a welcome development because it enables 
the courts to make a more accurate assessment of the innocent party's true loss. In Marlborough 
District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd (Altimarloch), 89  the Supreme Court had to 
  
84  Dunlop, above n 2, at 91–92. 
85  Paciocco (HCA), above n 3, at [321] (citations omitted). 
86  Cavendish, above n 1, at [99] per Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption, [193] per Lord Mance, and [286] per 
Lord Hodge. 
87  At [100] per Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption, and at [287] per Lord Hodge. 
88  Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd [2012] NZSC 11, [2012] 2 NZLR 726. The 
High Court of Australia has done likewise in Tabcorp Holdings Ltd v Bowen Investments Pty Ltd [2009] 
HCA 8, (2009) 236 CLR 272 at [12] referring to the promisee's legitimate interest in the performance of the 
breached term. 
89  Altimarloch, above n 88. 
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determine the appropriate compensation where a vendor of land had failed to provide promised 
water rights with the land. Access to water was of fundamental importance to the purchaser who had 
bought the land in order to establish a vineyard. The difference in value between land with and 
without the water rights was $400,000 while the cost to cure the breach was just over $1,000,000 
made up of the price of some water rights available for sale from a third party and the cost of 
construction of a dam on the land to capture the remaining shortfall in water. The three substantive 
judgments, given by Blanchard and Tipping JJ in the majority and Elias CJ in dissent, all referred to 
the need to award the cost of cure in cases where diminution in value did not give effect to the 
innocent party's performance interest.90 Blanchard and Tipping JJ went so far as to recognise an 
alternative category of damages to compensation which they labelled, unsurprisingly, performance 
damages and which are available where the subject matter of the contract cannot be readily 
substituted in the market.91 The majority awarded cost of cure. 
It is likely then that incorporation of the performance interest into the test for establishing 
penalties will be welcomed in New Zealand. Two notes of caution must be sounded, however. First, 
it is important that a party's performance interest is qualified by a requirement of legitimacy. If the 
rule against penalties is to remain coherent, the shift to focussing on performance interests must not 
be taken as free license by parties to include whatever remedies they might choose limited only by 
the requirement that they are not extravagant or exorbitant when compared with the overall purposes 
or objectives of their bargain. Rather, legitimate interests in performance should only be those that 
the court can recognise and for which it is able to provide relief. The reason parties cannot, for 
example, use agreed remedies to punish is ultimately because courts do not condone punishment for 
breach. 92  A performance interest that extended to justifying exemplary damages would be 
illegitimate. On the other hand, following Altimarloch, in a contract where the subject matter is 
unique, parties could stipulate an estimated cost of cure as payable for breach. Likewise, a provision 
requiring the breaching party to disgorge profits made in breach could be permitted so long as the 
particular contract is sufficiently analogous to other contracts in which courts have previously 
permitted account of profits or disgorgement for breach.93And, if the law of contract damages were 
to allow for punitive damages in the future, then it is entirely conceivable that a remedy stipulated 
by the parties could be intended to punish. The point is not that punishment is not allowed; but that 
  
90  At [25] per Elias CJ, [67] per Blanchard J and [107] per Tipping J. 
91  At [158] per Tipping J. In my opinion, these "performance damages" to award the cost of cure are really a 
form or measure of compensation damages where compensation is conceptualised more broadly than just 
direct or market loss. 
92  Paper Reclaim Ltd v Aotearoa Int Ltd [2006] 3 NZLR 188 (CA). 
93  Attorney-General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL) where the House of Lords relied upon the plaintiff having 
a legitimate interest in preventing breach to justify an account of profits; Stevens v Premium Real Estate 
[2009] NZSC 15, [2009] 2 NZLR 384; and Denaro Ltd v Onyx Bar & Cafe (Cambridge) Ltd HC Hamilton 
CIV 2010-419-777, 7 February 2011. 
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parties cannot provide a remedy that is beyond what the court can enforce. Terms stipulating 
remedies must continue to be compared to the remedies that would be available from the courts to 
test whether they are penal or not. 
In my view, to divorce the performance interest from available remedies risks confusing the 
parties' motivation for a clause with the function of a clause. It ought not to matter what reasons the 
party had for stipulating a particular secondary obligation, but simply whether the effect of that 
clause is a remedy contemplated by contract law. This is so for two reasons. First, the commercial, 
economic, or even moral reasons for which a party acts are not normally an enquiry the court makes 
or is equipped to make. That seems dangerously close to adjudication of parties' individual 
motivations which are not necessarily the subject of mutual agreement and not something of which 
the law of contract has traditionally taken note. Secondly, legitimate interests must be limited to 
those for which damages are recoverable "otherwise the prohibition on penalties would be 
illusory".94 
Hence, adapting the test of Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption cited earlier, the enquiry should 
be along the following lines: a clause will be a penalty where it is a secondary obligation that 
imposes a detriment on the contract-breaker (which may include a requirement to pay or transfer 
property or to forgo receipt of money or property), where that detriment is out of all proportion to 
any legitimate interest of the innocent party in the performance of the primary obligation. 
Legitimate interests are only those in relation to which a court would be likely to grant relief.  
The second note of caution to sound if the performance interest emphasis is adopted in New 
Zealand concerns the more practical issue of how the performance interest is to be identified; what 
evidence will be relevant to that question and to the subsequent inquiry of whether the stipulated 
clauses are excessive or exorbitant. The Supreme Court in Cavendish adopted a contextual 
approach, considering the wording of the clauses of the contract, and common practices that apply 
either in the relevant industry or to the type of transaction. Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption 
referred to the purpose of a clause being "ordinarily an inference from its effect".95  
In New Zealand, construction is a broad contextual exercise that admits both pre-contractual 
negotiations and subsequent conduct where relevant, and places significant weight on the notion of 
(commercial) common sense.96 Although there are signs in very recent cases that something of a 
retreat from the contextual approach is occurring where the ordinary meaning of the words in the 
  
94  Torchlight Fund, above n 5, at [189]. 
95  Cavendish, above n 1, at [28]. 
96  Vector Gas Ltd v Bay of Plenty Energy Ltd [2010] NZSC 5, [2010] 2 NZLR 444; and Gibbons Holdings Ltd 
v Wholesale Distributors Ltd [2007] NZSC 37, [2008] 1 NZLR 277. 
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written contract is plain, 97  recourse to context and reliance on inferences will likely become 
common in penalty disputes given that the parties' interest in performance is not often the subject of 
express drafting in contracts.98 The notion of performance interest is somewhat ambiguous and 
reasonable judges will inevitably differ on its identification on the facts of cases before them and on 
the relevant costs or susceptible losses in relation to that interest. Indeed, in Paciocco, while the 
majority concerned themselves with the bank's legitimate interest in receiving the payment due at 
all, Nettle J analysed the interest as being the receipt of payment on time. For the majority, this 
meant that the adverse effects of non-payment, not just late payment, were relevant to assessing 
whether the fee was disproportionate to the interest. 
When determining whether the particular clause is excessive or exorbitant, three further points 
are noted. First, their Lordships in Cavendish considered the circumstances of the parties to be 
important including the relative experience and sophistication of the parties; the respective 
bargaining strength of the parties; the presence of expert legal advice; and the extent of any 
negotiations. 99  Inequality of bargaining power, surprisingly, did not appear to feature in the 
deliberations of the majority in Paciocco, despite the case concerning a standard-form contract 
between a large commercial bank and general consumers.100  
Secondly, there is some uncertainty over whether evidence of actual loss sustained from breach 
can be relevant given that the question, whether a clause is penal, is to be decided at the time the 
contract was entered into. In the Full Court of the Federal Court in Paciocco, the Court had ruled 
any consideration of the resultant loss from breach irrelevant because such an approach was 
necessarily ex post facto both the formation and breach of the contract.101 The High Court of 
Australia had no such qualms.102 Lord Woolf in Philips Hong Kong Ltd v Attorney General of Hong 
Kong also admitted subsequent evidence.103  
Thirdly, there is also conflicting authority on whether either party's subjective state of mind is 
relevant. Some cases suggest not, reasoning that a clause can still be a penalty even if the innocent 
  
97  Firm PI 1 Ltd, above n 52; and New Zealand Carbon Farming Ltd v Mighty River Power Ltd [2015] NZCA 
605.  
98  One of the effects of greater recognition of the performance interest in contract law may be more 
information being included in the written contract itself to pre-empt courts from implying their own view of 
the bargain. This will likely lessen the need for courts to look to context outside the contract to construe the 
performance interest.  
99  Cavendish, above n 1, at [75] and [152]. 
100  But see Paciocco (HCA), above n 3, at [371] per Nettle J in dissent. 
101  Paciocco (FCFCA), above n  43,  at [116]–[117] per Allsop CJ. 
102  Paciocco (HCA), above n 3, at [169] per Gageler J. 
103  Philips Hong Kong Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong, above n 70, at 59. 
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party thought it had a legitimate commercial justification for the clause; and likewise, the fact that 
the defaulting party may have readily agreed and not felt pressured by the term will not save it from 
being a penalty. 104  Other cases have considered the parties' subjective understanding of the 
legitimacy of their purposes or interests as critical.105 However, the rule against penalties is not 
concerned with an allegation of any sort of fraud. There seems to be no good reason to depart from 
the standard objective approach to construction. 
V CONCLUSION 
The rule against penalties should not be understood as concerned primarily with preventing 
unfairness or unconscionability generally. The purpose of the rule is to prevent parties overreaching 
the court's remedial jurisdiction. It is fundamental that the court's ability to enforce a contract is not 
undermined in order that the institution of contracting is not itself undermined. The focus of the test 
is therefore on secondary obligations triggered by breach of other terms and should not be extended 
to enable the courts to police the content of other obligations in the contract. 
The test for penalties has until very recently required a comparison to likely recoverable loss. 
This is because common law courts have traditionally enforced contracts by requiring compensation 
for loss suffered. The intrusion on parties' autonomy that the rule against penalties has allowed was 
justified but only to the extent that it was concerned with achieving compensation for breach. The 
approach taken in Australia and the United Kingdom has recently shifted from a compensation-
based inquiry to one focusing on legitimate interests in performance. 
The performance interest is a helpful notion for identifying the true loss that results from breach 
but it must be applied cautiously. It should not be used to justify parties' use of stipulated remedies 
that exceed those available from the courts. To do so would jeopardise the court's crucial 
enforcement role. The performance interest is gaining significant traction in modern contract law 
but it raises important and difficult questions that need further detailed consideration. To what 
extent does the performance interest differ from the compensation principle? How is the 
performance interest to be identified in individual contracts? Are general principles of construction 
applicable or is a different enquiry needed?106 What evidence will be relevant? These enquiries lie 
beyond the scope of the present article. 
 
  
104  Cavendish, above n 1, at [28]; and Campbell Discount Co Ltd v Bridge [1962] AC 600 (HL) at 622 per Lord 
Radcliffe. 
105  See the cases discussed in Torchlight Fund, above n 5, at [110]–[117]. 
106  Dawson, above n 55, at 214. 
